Talent for Sale: The Need for Enhanced Scrutiny in Judicial Evaluation of Acqui-Hires by Nolan, Samantha
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 6
4-2016
Talent for Sale: The Need for Enhanced Scrutiny in
Judicial Evaluation of Acqui-Hires
Samantha Nolan
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Samantha Nolan, Talent for Sale: The Need for Enhanced Scrutiny in Judicial Evaluation of Acqui-Hires, 67 Hastings L.J. 849 (2016).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol67/iss3/6
Nolan-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:26 PM  
 
[849] 
Talent for Sale:  
The Need for Enhanced Scrutiny  
in Judicial Evaluation of Acqui-Hires  
Samantha Nolan* 
Large technology corporations are purchasing smaller companies at an increasing rate 
with one goal in mind—engineers. This practice has recently been given its own name—
acqui-hiring. The buying corporation purchases the target, poaches its employees, 
jettisons its projects, and generally kills the company. Who is injured in this process? 
Those who were legally supposed to be afforded the highest degree of protection at the 
target companies—the shareholder investors. 
 
This Note examines the practice of acqui-hiring and suggests that courts should analyze 
these transactions under heightened scrutiny. When addressing a target board’s decision 
to enter into an acqui-hire, courts can find guidance in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., an acquisition case that arose during a climate of similar corporate 
concerns. 
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Introduction 
An “acqui-hire” occurs when a company purchases a start-up in 
order to obtain desired talent, usually its founders and certain 
employees, and thereafter often kills the corporation or at least jettisons 
its products.1 Acqui-hiring is currently well known to those working in 
the technology sectors of business development, law, and investment in 
 
 1. Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y. Times, May 
18, 2011, at A1; Nate C. Hindman, The Top 15 Tech ‘Acqui-Hires’, HuffPost Tech (May 27, 2011, 
10:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/acqui-hires_n_867865.html. 
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Silicon Valley. However, recognition of the practice elsewhere is 
increasing, evidenced by the fact that it was even alluded to in HBO’s hit 
series Silicon Valley.2 This widespread awareness of acqui-hiring is bound to 
continue, as leading technology corporations are purchasing smaller start-up 
companies that operate in the same or similar fields at an increasing 
rate.3 While this might sound reminiscent of common corporate practices, 
the interesting twist in these transactions is that the buyer (“buying 
company” or “buying corporation”) is not interested in the projects or 
assets of the company being acqui-hired (“target company” or “target 
corporation”).4 Instead, the buyer is compelled by the desire to hire some 
or all of the target company’s engineers (“target employees” or “moving 
employees”).5 These transactions have grown to be so common that they 
have earned their own name—“acqui-hires.”6 
While documentation of this emerging practice has largely been 
confined to technology columns and blogs, a small number of legal 
authors have attempted to identify the possible motivation of the buyers 
in these transactions.7 In contrast, the purpose of this Note is to explore 
the actions of the leaders at the target companies and recommend a 
heightened level of judicial scrutiny when reviewing them. Enhanced 
judicial scrutiny is necessary because directors of corporations have 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders, and these duties may be 
compromised in acqui-hire transactions due to a number of concerns, 
including self-dealing and misplaced fiduciary duties. While acqui-hiring 
is a novel practice, the legal community can find guidance in past judicial 
directives that demanded increased protection for shareholders during a 
climate of similar corporate concerns. 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.8 was a 
groundbreaking case regarding specified duties of corporate directors 
and it created what are known today as “Revlon duties.”9 According to 
Revlon, a corporation’s “board of directors has a duty to maximize 
shareholder value in the event that either the company is for sale or the 
break-up of the company becomes inevitable.”10 If a board decides to sell 
 
 2. Silicon Valley: Bad Money (HBO television broadcast Apr. 26, 2015). 
 3. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 Duke L.J. 281, 283 (2013). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 284. “Some commentators refer to this phenomenon as an ‘acqhire’ or a ‘talent 
acquisition.’” Id. at 284, n.4. 
 7. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 283, 292, 315, 318 (explaining acqui-hiring as an attempt 
to remain on friendly terms with venture capitalists); Andres Sawicki, Buying Teams, 38 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 651, 651 (2015) (arguing that patent law is a motivation of “the choice to pursue an acqui-hire 
because it enables the buyer to obtain assets useful in team production”). 
 8. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 9. Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: 
The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 609, 620 (1995). 
 10. Id. at 626. 
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a company and there is a question as to whether the board is fulfilling its 
Revlon duties, the actions of the directors “are no longer protected by 
the business judgment rule11 and are subject to [] enhanced 
scrutiny . . . . The [Revlon] court stated that the board must be active, not 
passive. It must stimulate competitive bidding and not lay barriers to the 
process.”12 In other words, once it is inevitable that a company will be 
sold or dissolved, the board members are required to actively pursue the 
highest sale price in the interest of increasing shareholder profits. As 
judges encounter more and more acqui-hire cases, Revlon can provide 
them with a standard under which to evaluate the decisions of the boards 
at the companies being acqui-hired (“target boards”). 
The actions of target boards in acqui-hire transactions are beginning 
to be scrutinized by adversely affected individuals associated with the 
target corporations. California courts are now presented with cases 
focusing on acqui-hires, namely, Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc.13 and 
Opperman v. Path, Inc.14 In Graphicly, a shareholder of the target 
company filed suit against the Graphicly board members and the 
purchasing corporation, Blurb, Inc.15 The complaint alleged that “the 
Board of Graphicly tacitly agreed to give away the company’s only assets 
to Blurb with no consideration paid to the shareholders of Graphicly 
then let the company shut down.”16 The claim centered on the assertion 
that the board breached its fiduciary duties by strategically transferring 
members of the Graphicly creative team and “not taking action to 
protect [] confidentiality and proprietary information from being 
accessed by [] Blurb.”17 The Plaintiff claimed such a breach of fiduciary 
duties caused the company to suffer damages in excess of five million 
dollars.18  
In comparison, the complaint in Opperman was not filed by a 
shareholder, but was brought on behalf of past tort victims of a target 
 
 11. This rule reflects a judicial policy of deferring to the business judgment of corporate directors 
when they make corporate decisions: “courts will not second-guess a business decision, so long as 
corporate management exercised a minimum level of care in arriving at the decision.” 3A Jennifer L. 
Berger et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1036 (2015). See Part 
I.B.I for a more detailed discussion of the business judgment rule. 
 12. Kerr, supra note 9, at 626–27. 
 13. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment of Graphicly, Inc. to a Defendant, 
Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc. at 3, No. 5:14-cv-04630-NC, 2014 WL 6711931 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014) 
[hereinafter Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment]. 
 14. 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 15. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 3. 
 16. Id. at 1. 
 17. Jury Demanded, Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc. at 2, No. 5:14-cv-04630-NC, 2014 WL 5337027 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014). 
 18. Id. at 3. 
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corporation on claims of successor liability and fraudulent transfer.19 The 
Opperman complaint declared that “[t]he acqui-hire is just the latest 
incarnation of the age-old (and mostly discredited) strategy of buying 
assets while claiming not to buy liabilities in a corporate acquisition.”20 
The plaintiffs implored the court to make the first judicial ruling 
expressly regulating acqui-hires.21 The existence of Graphicly and 
Opperman suggest that California courts will continue to encounter 
acqui-hire cases and should be prepared to address the legal issues acqui-
hires present including fiduciary duty conflicts, fraudulent transfers, and 
successor liability issues. 
In order to address the concerns that acqui-hires pose, this Note 
proposes that (1) once the board of a target company becomes seriously 
involved in an acqui-hire, their fiduciary duties should shift to the 
requirements called for in Revlon duties, and (2) these transactions 
should be viewed as inherently suspect and therefore scrutinized under a 
higher standard than the business judgment rule, and perhaps even be 
analyzed under an entire fairness standard if self-dealing can be clearly 
identified. To establish the foundation for this proposal, Part I provides 
background information on acqui-hiring and Revlon duties. Part II then 
discusses emerging acqui-hire court cases, identifies what is taken from 
shareholders in these transactions, investigates the misplaced fiduciary 
duty to employees in these deals, and explains how the requirements that 
trigger Revlon duties are present in these transactions. This Note 
concludes by suggesting what the duties of target boards in acqui-hire 
transactions should be, along with the standard under which judges 
should review their actions. 
 
 19. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc.’s and Gowalla Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) at 1–2, In re Apple IDevice Address Book Litig., No. 3:13-cv-00453-JST, 2013 
U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 9482 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 
Facebook, Inc.]. “Successor liability is an exception to the general rule that, when one corporate or 
other juridical person sells assets to another entity, the assets are transferred free and clear of all but 
valid liens and security interests.” George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor 
Liability, 6 Fla. St. U. Bus. L. Rev. 9, 11 (2007). “When successor liability is imposed, a creditor or 
plaintiff with a claim against the seller may assert that claim against and collect payment from the 
purchaser.” Id. In the context of acquisition structures, “[t]he purchaser can leave behind certain 
liabilities in an asset sale, whereas in a stock sale the assets remain encumbered by all known and 
unknown liabilities.” Brian Stuart Duba & Frost Brown Todd LLC, Asset v. Stock Sales and Backdoor 
Liability Assumption in Asset Sales, 33 E. Min. L. Found. § 17.05 (2012). Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “fraudulent conveyance” as a “transfer of property for little or no consideration, made for the 
purpose of hindering or delaying a creditor by putting the property beyond the creditor’s reach.” 
Fraudulent Conveyance, Black’s Law Dictionary 17(c) (10th ed. 2014). 
 20. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 2. 
 21. Id. at 4. 
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I.  Background 
In order to provide context for the proposals in this Note, this Part 
will present background information on acqui-hiring and the relevant 
material related to Revlon duties. First, it describes what an acqui-hire is, 
gives a short background on company financing, and reviews acqui-hire 
concerns that have already been posed. Next, Part I explains the three 
levels of judicial review applied to director decisions, provides an 
overview of the historical climate at the time of Revlon, presents pre-
Revlon cases and Revlon itself, and lastly provides justifications for the 
duties created in Revlon. 
A. Acqui-Hiring 
1. What Is an “Acqui-Hire”? 
Typical corporate acquisitions are driven by the desire to obtain a 
company’s assets, whether they are tangible, such as property or 
equipment, or intangible, such as intellectual property or reputation.22 
However, acqui-hiring has a different focus altogether—engineers.23 This 
practice is drawing the attention of the business community as the 
occurrence rate of acqui-hire deals continues to increase. In fact, 
[r]ecent examples of talent-driven transactions include Twitter’s 
acquisitions of Summify in January 2012 and Posterous in March 
2012,24 Google’s acquisitions of Milk in March 2012 and RestEngine in 
May 2012,25 Zynga’s acquisitions of area/code in January 2011 and Buzz 
Monkey in June 2012,26 Groupon’s acquisition of ditto.me in April 
2012,27 LinkedIn’s acquisition of IndexTank in October 2011,28 and 
Facebook’s acquisitions of Lightbox and Glancee, both in May 2012.29 
 
 22. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 293. 
 23. Id. at 283. 
 24. Marita Makinen et al., Acqui-Hires for Growth: Planning for Success, 28 Venture Cap. Rev. 
31, 31 (2012) (first citing Mike Issac, Twitter Acquires Social-Aggregation Startup Summify, WIRED 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/01/twitter-summify-acquisition/; then citing 
Laurie Segall, Why Twitter Bought Tumblr’s Biggest Rival, Posterous, CNNMoney (Mar. 14, 2012, 3:06 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/14/technology/posterous_twitter/). 
 25. Id. at 31 (first citing Alexia Tsotsis, Winning a Bidding War with Facebook, Google Picks up the 
Milk Product Team, TechCrunch (Mar. 15, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/15/winning-a-bidding- 
war-with-facebook-google-picks-up-the-entire-milk-team/; then citing Josh Constine, Twitter Buys 
Personalized Email Marketer RestEngine to Deliver Best Tweet Digests, TechCrunch (May 10, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/10/twitter-acquires-restengine/). 
 26. Id. at 32 (first citing Dean Takahashi, Zynga Dials Area/Code Game Studio for an Acquisition, 
VentureBeat (Jan. 21, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/01/21/zynga-dials-areacode-game-
studio-for-an-acquisition/; then citing Kim-Mai Cutler, Zynga Adds 50 People Through Talent Acquisition of 
Video Game Marker Buzz Monkey, TechCrunch (June 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/04/zynga-
acquires-buzz-monkey/). 
 27. Id. at 32 (citing Colleen Taylor, Groupon Acquires Social Recommendation App Ditto.me, 
TechCrunch (Apr. 16, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/16/groupon-acquires-ditto-me-the-social- 
recommendation-and-planning-app/). 
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Even Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of the world’s leading social network 
company, has come to embrace the value of acqui-hiring and has said, 
“Facebook has not once bought a company for the company itself. We 
buy companies to get excellent people.”30 Indeed, the “acqui-hire” label 
might be somewhat new, but it is easy to see that the substantive aspect 
of these transactions has been very common in recent years. 
Acqui-hire transactions can be structured in several different ways.31 
In the acqui-hire’s most basic form, it is structured as a payment of cash 
in exchange for the target company’s agreement “not to sue the buyer for 
hiring its employees” and “the startup thereafter liquidates.”32 Generally, 
large acqui-hire deals are structured as asset sales; however, the only 
“assets acquired by the purchaser are whatever intellectual property 
rights that the startup owns; other assets—such as property, plant, and 
equipment—are left behind. The consideration paid by the buyer and 
any residual assets are then distributed to shareholders in the liquidation 
of the startup.”33 In even larger acqui-hire transactions, the deal can be 
structured as a merger or stock purchase resulting in the target company 
generally receiving stock in the buying corporation as part of the 
consideration.34 In conclusion, the way that these transactions are 
structured affects what exactly the target company investors are left with 
when the deal closes. 
These transactions have not gone unnoticed, and scholarship 
discussing acqui-hires thus far has analyzed the motivation of the buying 
corporations. That is, the question presented has been: why do buyers 
not save themselves the trouble of the acquisition and simply pursue the 
engineers individually or “poach” the engineering team in its entirety?35 
This question is even more poignant given that acqui-hiring was born in 
California, a state that provides for easy employee mobility and disfavors 
 
 28. Id. at 32 (citing Colleen Taylor, LinkedIn Acquires Search Engine Startup IndexTank, 
GIGAOM (Oct. 11, 2011, 2:41 PM), https://gigaom.com/2011/10/11/linkedin-acquires-search-engine-
startup-indextank/). 
 29. Id. at 32 (first citing Josh Constine, Facebook Hires Team from Android Photosharing App Dev 
Lightbox to Quiet Mobile Fears, TechCrunch (May 15, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/15/facebook-
lightbox/; then citing Mike Isaac, Ramping up Mobile Discovery, Facebook Acquires Glancee, AllThingsD 
(May 4, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20120504/ramping-up-mobile-discovery-facebook-acqhires-
glancee/). 
 30. Id. at 31 (quoting Nathaniel Cahners Hindman, Mark Zuckerberg: ‘We Buy Companies to Get 
Excellent People’, Huffington Post (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/ 
10/19/mark-zuckerberg-we-buy-co_n_767338.html). 
 31. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 296. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 282; see also John Sullivan, Acqui-Hiring: A Powerful Recruiting Strategy That You’ve Never 
Heard Of, Ere.net (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.ere.net/2012/12/10/acqui-hiring-a-powerful-recruiting-
strategy-that-youve-never-heard-of/. 
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covenants not to compete.36 Considering that “poaching” employees in 
the Golden State arguably involves little fear of litigation, John F. Coyle 
and Gregg D. Polsky, in their article titled Acqui-Hiring, proposed that 
the buyers’ motivation stems from social norms in the Silicon Valley.37 
They suggested that the buyer is incentivized by a desire to remain on 
friendly terms with venture capital funds.38 Other theories of buyer 
motivation include a greater chance at retaining the team following the 
transaction, or the buyer having a specific project in mind for an 
engineering team that has already proven itself.39 Aside from the exact 
motivation of the purchasing corporation, it is important to understand 
the financial structures of small companies because those in different 
financial positions at target corporations will have distinct incentives in a 
dissolution. 
2. Company Financing 
In order to finance a start-up, entrepreneurs generally sell equity in 
their company to outside investors who usually take the form of either 
venture capitals or wealthy individuals known as “angel investors.”40 In 
exchange for their investment, the venture capitals commonly receive 
preferred stock, which generally comes with certain managing rights and 
a liquidation preference.41 Angel investors are ordinarily given convertible 
promissory notes, though it is becoming increasingly common for these 
notes to be entitled to an acquisition premium if the company is acquired 
before any successive equity financing.42 In comparison, founders, 
employees, and other smaller investors generally receive common stock or 
the option to purchase such common stock.43 Based on these facts, it can 
be suggested that venture capitals and angel investors have a lowered 
risk of financial harm in an acqui-hire and the following dissolution of 
assets because they have a liquidation preference and acquisition premium, 
respectively. Nevertheless, even with their enhanced financial positions, 
these investors still do not receive a full return on their investment in 
 
 36. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 282. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 308–09. A venture capital fund is “[a]n investment fund that manages money from investors 
seeking private equity stakes in startup and small- and medium-size enterprises with strong growth potential. 
These investments are generally characterized as high-risk/high-return opportunities.” Venture Capital 
Funds, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vcfund.asp#ixzz3mhoP26Q9 (last visited Apr. 10, 
2016).  
 39. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 32–33. 
 40. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 287–88. “Angel investors are wealthy individuals who 
personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists but at an earlier 
stage.” Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not so) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1405, 
1406 (2008). 
 41. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 289. 
 42. Id. at 289–90. 
 43. Id. at 289. 
Nolan-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:26 PM 
April 2016] ACQUI-HIRE TRANSACTIONS 857 
acqui-hires because founder “entrepreneurs try to figure out . . . ‘the 
lowest amount [that must be paid] to investors so that [they] don’t 
squawk.’”44 Moreover, smaller investors and undesired employees with 
common stock are at an even greater risk because they are the last to 
receive payment, if any even remains. Thus, this financial structure 
enhances the apprehensions of investors and shareholders at target 
corporations because of the decrease on investment overall and the 
increased chance that smaller shareholders will either not get payment or 
will get only a nominal amount. 
3. Current Concerns Regarding Acqui-Hiring 
In order to provide background on the current apprehensions 
surrounding acqui-hires, this Subpart explores concerns that have 
previously been presented in the existing literature. First, it sets forth 
discoveries of general injustice to acqui-hire target shareholders that 
have been identified by those researching the field. To expand on this 
issue, the discussion shows that the expected return on investment to 
stockholders can be drastically reduced, especially if the consideration 
for the transaction is cash or stock in a public company with slower 
growth.45 Furthermore, greater concern arises because expenses of acqui-
hires often reduce cash considerations, making these transactions even 
less appealing to investors.46 Finally, this Subpart addresses other 
concerns that have been identified, including: the way in which the 
consideration will be divided at the target corporation; the general 
unease regarding the premature death of an emerging company; and the 
reality that the deal considerations might include a great amount of 
illiquid stock for inappropriate employee incentive and tax reasons.47 
A major issue in acqui-hire negotiations centers on how the buyer’s 
collective purchase price will be allocated between the target company’s 
moving employees and its outside investors.48 An acqui-hire is usually 
structured as an asset sale, or occasionally as a stock purchase or merger 
with stock in the buyer included as part of the consideration.49 Either way 
it is structured, the buyer offers this consideration in a single aggregate 
amount.50 Both the consideration for the deal, which eventually goes to 
outside investors and shareholders, and the compensation pool, which 
goes to the desired founders and employees for future work, are offered 
 
 44. Id. at 317. 
 45. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 33. 
 46. Id. at 35. 
 47. Id. at 33, 35. 
 48. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 287. 
 49. Id. at 296. 
 50. Id. at 299. 
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together.51 The compensation pool does not make its way into the hands 
of outside investors or employee shareholders whom the buyer does not 
desire to retain as future employees.52 Accordingly, these outside 
investors and employees would prefer a greater amount to be divided to 
the deal consideration pot, while the moving employees and the buyer 
want a greater amount to go toward the compensation pot.53 Disputes 
about division of these funds present a chief place of disagreement for 
shareholders and the negotiating insiders. Therefore, it would be ideal to 
alternatively offer these two sets of payment separately in the interest of 
protecting investors. 
Another frustration with these transactions is that they oftentimes 
result in the premature death of companies that might have grown to be 
great successes if given the time and opportunity to do so. In regard to 
this concern, it is important to point out that acqui-hiring could occur as 
an alternative to liquidation, or simply an alternative to continuing 
business.54 For example, an acqui-hire that would be an alternative to 
liquidation can take place when the target company is unable to 
successfully bring a product to the market before it runs out of funding 
and is unable to access additional money.55 In this situation, the choice is 
generally between acquiescing to the acqui-hire or succumbing to complete 
liquidation.56 However, some acqui-hires occur in place of accepting 
additional available funding, and this happens when the leaders at the 
target corporation decide that the acqui-hire offer is more appealing than 
continuing as a company.57 This second scenario implicates fiduciary duties 
to stockholders because the target company still has a chance of survival 
and possible growth, which suggests that it could have eventually provided 
larger returns to its investors.58 
The structure of acqui-hire transactions can also create taxation 
concerns for shareholders. Acqui-hires are generally structured as asset 
purchases.59 As an alternative, shareholders would prefer to configure the 
deals as stock sales or mergers so they would be taxed as stock sales 
 
 51. Id. at 297–98. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 299. The purchasing corporations want more money to be allocated to desired employees so 
that the employees will be comfortable with the transition and will be more likely to remain in their new 
positions long-term. Id.  
 54. Id. at 295. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. For more information to provide support and context for this proposition see infra Part II.B. 
 59. Jeff Seul, A 360° View of Current Emerging Company M&A Practice Trends, in Mergers and 
Acquisitions Law 2014 Top Lawyers on Trends and Key Strategies for the Upcoming Year 33, 43 
(Aspatore 2013). An asset acquisition occurs when a corporation purchases all or substantially all of 
another company’s assets, which can include its property and its goodwill, for either money or other 
property. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271 (West 2010). 
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instead of asset sales.60 This would be more favorable for the 
shareholders “because the deal consideration they receive would be 
taxed as capital gains (i.e., at a lower rate).”61 Unfortunately for 
shareholders, they are not typically successful in this pursuit because the 
target engineers, who are the focus of the deal, would be financially 
harmed. 62 To illustrate, if the acqui-hire was not structured as an asset 
purchase, then all of the consideration received by a target engineer “via 
signing bonuses or participation in a buyer’s equity-compensation plan” 
would be taxed as compensation income.63 That compensation income 
would be subject to a high combined federal and state rate, and therefore 
would not be financially desirable for the employee.64 Alternatively, due 
to the current popular structure of the acqui-hire, the portion of the 
consideration that goes to the engineer from the deal consideration is 
characterized as payment for her stock in the startup.65 This payment is 
labeled as capital gains and “by shifting part of the buyer’s purchase 
price to the deal-consideration pool, the engineer cuts her tax rate 
approximately in half on the amounts that come back to her as payment 
for her equity interest in the startup.”66 Due to this common method of 
structuring acqui-hire transactions, tax apprehensions are simply one of 
the many concerns that have already been raised by those who study 
these deals. While the above presented concerns surrounding acqui-hires 
are legitimate, an approach to address those concerns and regulate acqui-
hires generally can be found within the requirements of fiduciary duties 
and accepted case law, such as Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.67 
B. REVLON Duties 
In order to identify the relevant legal concepts, this Subpart will first 
characterize the three levels of judicial review used to evaluate the 
decisions of directors. Next, it will describe the corporate climate at the 
time when Revlon and similar cases were decided, as well as present the 
relevant cases leading up to Revlon and the Revlon case itself. Lastly, this 
Subpart will briefly outline justifications for the creation of Revlon duties. 
 
 60. Seul, supra note 59, at 40. Stock sales occur when the target’s shares are sold to the buyer in 
exchange for cash, securities, or a combination of both. Mergers occur when the target merges into the 
buyer and the stock of the target is exchanged for cash or securities. Stephen I. Glover, Business 
Separation Transactions: Spin Offs, Subsidiary IPOs and Tracking Stock § 12A.04[2] 12A-8 (2006). 
 61. Seul, supra note 59, at 40. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 329. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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1. The Three Levels of Judicial Review of Directors’ Decisions 
When evaluating board decisions, judges apply three levels of 
review: (1) the business judgment rule, (2) the reasonableness standard 
called for under both Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.68 and Revlon, 
and (3) the entire fairness standard.69 The default and most deferential 
standard is the business judgment rule, which has essentially become a 
rubberstamp by judges in the evaluation of board decisionmaking.70 The 
business judgment rule “provides a rebuttable presumption ‘that in making 
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company.’ Thus, at bottom, the business 
judgment rule reflects little more than process inquiry.”71 
The second level, the reasonableness standard, is triggered by certain 
facts and involves an investigation by the court into the reasonableness of 
the decisions of directors.72 For instance, the Unocal court, in considering 
the reasonableness of defensive tactics put in place by the board, 
considered whether the board was independent, highly informed, and 
acted in good faith.73 Going even further, the Revlon court demanded, in 
“change of control” transactions, a more generalized reasonableness, 
which included stricter language than Unocal and added a focus on 
attaining the best value for shareholders.74 The Revlon reasonableness 
“standard requires virtually absolute independence of the board, careful 
attention to the type and scope of information to be considered by the 
board, good faith negotiation, and a focus on what constitutes the best 
value for the shareholders.”75 
The third level, the entire fairness standard, is triggered “where a 
majority of the directors approving the transaction [are] interested or 
where a majority stockholder stands on both sides of the transaction.”76 
Board members could be considered to be on both sides of the 
transaction if they “‘expect to derive any personal financial benefit from 
it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves 
upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.’”77 Under entire 
 
 68. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 69. Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action to Meet the Ever-Decreasing Scope 
of Revlon Duties, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 505, 507 (1999). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 507–08 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 72. Engledow, supra note 69, at 508. 
 73. Id. (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). 
 74. Engledow, supra note 69, at 508 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986)). 
 75. Engledow, supra note 69, at 508. 
 76. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 77. Id. at 508–09 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
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fairness standard review, the board has the burden of showing, by both 
fair dealing and fair price, that the transaction was fair to shareholders.78 
2. Corporate Climate at Time of Revlon and Similar Cases 
The corporate environment at the time of Revlon and its 
predecessors draws comparisons to the similar short-term profitability 
concerns in acqui-hire transactions. The 1980s were a transformative 
period for corporations and corporate law due to struggles for corporate 
control, new types of financial acquirers, and a change in the political 
climate.79 In the early 1980s, battles for corporate control began as an 
effort to capitalize on depressed stock prices, but this quickly transformed 
into a takeover frenzy.80 Corporations started to develop new radical 
defensive tactics in order to fend off both actual and perceived hostile 
bidders.81 Thus, the period produced an increase in hostile acquisitions 
leading to a need for more rigorous corporate defensive strategies. 
As the form of the conventional American investor shifted, 
increased anxieties began to surface that boards were becoming more 
concerned with short-term gains rather than the longevity of their 
companies.82 In the 1980s, interest rates began falling due to stock prices 
being undervalued, and many of the largest companies in America had 
little debt and a surplus of cash.83 A chief development that grew out of 
this situation was the changing nature of the investor.84 Based on the 
goals of the new prominent type of investor, the corporate focus changed 
from an objective of long-term gains to that of short-run returns.85 
Consequently, this created an environment where, “[f]or the first time, 
corporations were compelled to maximize short-term profitability at the 
expense of long-term goals.”86 Acquirers were not concerned with the 
corporations they were acquiring or those corporations’ shareholders; 
 
 78. Engledow, supra note 69, at 509. 
 79. Andrew G. T. Moore, II, The 1980s—Did We Save the Stockholders While the Corporation 
Burned?, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 277, 278 (1992) (“The Reagan Administration believed that free markets 
worked best, and that government should interfere in business and finance as little as possible. 
Laissez-faire was the call of the day.”). 
 80. Id. at 277 (“With millions to be made in breakups and exorbitant fees, acquirors [sic] and their 
financial advisors, who cared little or nothing for the corporation itself, plotted new forms of attack 
that made virtually any company a takeover candidate.”). 
 81. Id. at 277–78. 
 82. See id. at 278–79. 
 83. Id. at 278. 
 84. Id. (“More than fifty percent of the outstanding shares of Fortune 500 companies were held by 
institutional investors with professional portfolio managers. Arbitrageurs amassed huge positions in potential 
targets—hoping to put companies ‘in play.’ Many such efforts were intentionally manipulative and illegal.”). 
 85. Id. at 278–79. 
 86. Id. 
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instead their focus was on their own financial profits.87 Given each of the 
contributing circumstances of the time period, it was left to Delaware 
courts to regulate corporate takeovers, which they did, most notably in 
Revlon and its surrounding cases.88 
3. Pre-Revlon Cases 
The path to the creation of Revlon duties was built on concepts from 
corporate cases decided during the several preceding years. The 
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom89 was 
the first in this line of historical cases. The Van Gorkom court held that 
board members breach fiduciary duties to stockholders when they obligate 
themselves to a sale of the company under hasty and uninformed 
conditions.90 Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G. T. Moore II, 
who joined the majority opinion, later wrote, “Van Gorkom was much 
more a case about process in the takeover environment than anything 
else.”91 He explained, “the protection of the business judgment rule is not 
a birthright of directors but, rather, is given in return for care, loyalty, 
and unyielding good faith to the corporation.”92 Thus, the Van Gorkom 
case demonstrated the willingness of judges to question board decisions 
when they were not made carefully and in consideration of the 
corporation itself and its shareholders. 
The court was able to build upon its decision in Van Gorkom when 
it resolved Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.93 In Unocal, the 
Delaware Supreme Court analyzed, for the first time, a corporation that 
presented its own self-tender to defend against a hostile takeover offer.94 
A self-tender is an “offer made by an issuer . . . for any class of the 
issuer’s own securities.”95 Self-tenders generally occur in response to a 
hostile tender offer and are organized as a repurchase program in order 
to provide shareholders an alternative purchaser and entice them to 
 
 87. Id. at 279 (noting that, due to the changing investor, along with the economic and political 
climate of the time, the “1980s marked a period of massive wealth shifting, but little wealth creation.”).  
 88. Id. at 280. For those unfamiliar with the corporate legal field, “Delaware corporate law has 
been transformed into something akin to a national law of corporations as other states follow its lead 
. . . [T]here can be no dispute that Delaware is winning the race.” Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a 
Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1099, 1099–1100 (1999); see 
also Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 34 (“[D]irectors of California corporations would be served well 
by understanding Delaware case law, which is based on the same basic duties of care and loyalty as 
clearly apply to California corporations.”). 
 89. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 90. Moore, supra note 79, at 281. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 94. Moore, supra note 79, at 283. 
 95. Meredith M. Brown et al., Takeovers: A Strategic Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions 
xxxi (3d ed. 2011). 
Nolan-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:26 PM 
April 2016] ACQUI-HIRE TRANSACTIONS 863 
decline the hostile offer.96 In evaluating Unocal’s defensive strategy, the 
court laid out two conditions that must be met before boards in similar 
situations would receive the protection of the business judgment rule.97 
The court explained that “[f]irst, directors must show that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed. This burden is satisfied by showing good faith and 
reasonable investigation. Second, the defensive measures must be 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”98 Thus, boards can use drastic 
measures when they believe an outsider’s attempted purchase threatens 
the corporation, but the measures need to be informed, in good faith, 
and reasonable. The court also explained that when taking these types of 
measures, the board could consider the interests of “shareholders . . . and 
perhaps even the community generally.”99 Additional permitted 
considerations are “inadequacy of the price, nature and timing of the 
offer, questions of illegality, risk of nonconsummation, quality of 
securities being offered, and the bidder’s identity and background.”100 In 
conclusion, this case, along with Van Gorkom, exemplified the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s move away from a presumption of business judgment 
rule protection toward demanding a higher standard of board members 
in sale situations. 
4. Revlon Duties Creation and Clarification 
Building upon the court’s development toward a less deferential 
review of corporate decisions, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.101 created the “Revlon duties” that are well-known today 
in corporate law.102 In 1985, the CEO of Pantry Pride, Ronald O. 
Perelman, started to discuss an acquisition of Revlon by Pantry Pride 
with a representative from Revlon, Michel C. Bergerac, who had strong 
personal dislike for Perelman.103 In response to Perelman’s interest, the 
 
 96. Edward Brodsky & M. Patricia Adamski, Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: 
Rights, Duties and Liabilities § 6:9 (2015). 
 97. Moore, supra note 79, at 283. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 102. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff’d, 535 
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). 
 103. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. The board of Pantry Pride authorized Perelman to acquire Revlon, 
either by negotiating for $42–$43 per share or by making a hostile tender offer at $45 per share. Id. at 
176. Revlon was advised by one of its investment bankers that $45 per share was a “grossly inadequate 
price for the company.” Id. at 176–77. Pantry Pride then made a cash tender offer at $47.50 per share 
and the Revlon board began to explore defensive measures. Id. at 177. The directors at Revlon created 
a Rights Plan, which was considered to be a “poison pill” in corporate takeover language. Id. at 180 
(citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). A “poison pill” has been described 
as a scheme where shareholders get the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substantial 
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Revlon board authorized the company’s management to negotiate with 
other parties also interested in acquiring Revlon.104 While Revlon 
searched for other acquirers, Pantry Pride continued to raise its initial 
cash bid offer of $45 per share, until it reached a final proposition of $58 
per share.105 The Revlon board eventually decided that it wanted 
Forstmann Little & Co., an acquirer it apparently had more friendly 
feelings toward than Pantry Pride or Perelman, to acquire Revlon.106 The 
board bolstered Forstmann’s bargaining power by giving Forstmann 
access to Revlon financial data that Pantry Pride was not aware of, 
placing the two parties on unequal negotiation grounds.107 Following 
negotiations, Forstmann made an offer less than Pantry Pride’s, at $57.25 
per share, and also required the Revlon board to put into place several 
defensive measures.108 The Revlon board complied with Forstmann’s 
request and accordingly put into place numerous defensive strategies to 
insulate the company from Pantry Pride and other potential acquirers.109 
Thereafter, Pantry Pride sought injunctive relief barring Revlon’s 
defensive strategies and requested a temporary restraining order on 
Revlon’s assets to halt any attempted transfer to Forstmann.110 In 
evaluating Pantry Pride’s claims, the court considered the appropriateness 
of the Revlon board’s actions, most importantly, in the implementation 
of the defensive measures.111 
 
premium price. Id. Revlon launched its own offer for up to ten million shares and its stockholders 
tendered eighty-seven percent of outstanding shares. Id. at 177, 181–82. 
 104. Id. at 176–77. 
 105. Id. at 179–80. 
 106. Id. at 175, 176, 178. 
 107. Id. at 178. 
 108. Id. at 175, 178. These defensive measures included a lock-up option (an option for Forstmann 
to purchase certain assets), a no-shop provision (a promise by Revlon to deal only with Forstmann), 
and Revlon agreeing to a $25 million cancellation fee to go to Forstmann if their agreement was 
terminated. Id. 
 109. Id. at 178–79. The Revlon court explained that, in implementing antitakeover measures, the 
concern arises that a “board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 180 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 954 (Del. 1985)). Due to this potential conflict of interest, the directors of a board using defensive 
tactics has the burden of showing that they had a reasonable belief that the corporation was in danger 
and this burden can by satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation. Id. (citing 
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). The directors also have to show “that the responsive action taken [was] 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Id. (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). 
 110. Id. at 179. 
 111. Id. at 175–76. The court analyzed the separate defensive measures that the Revlon board 
implemented. The first defensive tool that the court examined was the “poison pill” Rights Plan. Id. at 
180. When Revlon initially implemented the Rights Plan, the Pantry Pride hostile takeover bid was at 
$45 per share, which was a price that the Revlon board was advised as being grossly inadequate, 
making the implementation of the poison pill reasonable and in good faith. Id. at 180–81. 
Nevertheless, the continued use of the Rights Plan became moot when, for the favor of Forstmann, the 
board passed a resolution redeeming the Rights in regard to any cash proposal of $57.25 or more. Id. 
at 181. All of the involved offers eventually equaled or surpassed that amount so the Rights were no 
longer an obstruction in the contest for acquisition. Id. The court then analyzed the Revlon board’s 
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In the Revlon holding, the court emphasized a higher standard in 
the realm of board member fiduciary duties during an acquisition or 
sale.112 The court explained that the Revlon directors undertook 
considerations not related to the maximization of shareholder profit, and 
that such measures could not “be sustained when [they] represent[] a 
breach of the directors’ fundamental duty of care.”113 Therefore, the 
court concluded that the board’s actions were not entitled to business 
judgment rule deference.114 Instead, the court held the Revlon board to a 
higher standard, explaining that when the board members first 
recognized that the company was for sale, their duties changed from 
ensuring the “preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to [maximizing] 
the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”115 Therefore, 
“[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to 
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale 
of the company.”116 Thus, the court emphasized that boards are required 
to keep shareholders’ best interests as their primary focus and that less 
deference would be afforded if there appeared to be deviation from that 
practice. 
Several years later, building upon Revlon, Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.117 addressed a portion of the Revlon 
framework that Revlon left unclear: when is a company “for sale?”118 In 
Paramount, a planned merger between Time and Warner was set to take 
place.119 When Paramount learned of the intended merger, Paramount 
announced an impeding offer for Time at $175 per share, which Time 
rejected.120 Paramount then raised its all cash offer to $200 per share, 
which Time, again, rejected.121 The Time board genuinely believed that 
the merger with Warner was going to be better for the Time company in 
 
own exchange offer for ten million of its own shares, which may have been reasonable when Pantry 
Pride’s offer was at $47.50 a share; however, when Pantry Pride increased its offer to “$53, it became 
apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable.” Id. at 182. The court further noted 
that “Forstmann had already been drawn into the contest on a preferred basis, so the result of the 
lock-up was not to foster bidding, but to destroy it” and that “the [no-shop] agreement . . . ended 
rather than intensified the board’s involvement in the bidding contest.” Id. at 183–84. 
 112. See id. at 185. 
 113. Id. (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985)). The court explained that 
Revlon’s defensive tactics worked to the benefit of the shareholders in the beginning; however, 
considering the totality of the defensive moves throughout the life span of the takeover period, the 
court found that the directors considered inappropriate factors. Id. 
 114. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. 
 115. Id. at 182 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 118. Moore, supra note 79, at 285–86. 
 119. Id. at 286. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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the long run.122 Consequently, out of fear that Time shareholders would 
be blindly attracted to Paramount’s high cash offer, the Time board 
changed the structure of their planned merger with Warner.123 Time and 
Warner restructured the merger from a stock swap to a cash offer, 
thereby eliminating the need for a vote from the shareholders and 
allowing Time to continue with its original plan.124 In response, both 
Paramount and shareholders of Time filed suits, which were eventually 
consolidated, to halt the planned merger with Warner.125 The court had 
to evaluate whether to allow Time and Warner to proceed with their 
restructured merger.126 
The Paramount court held that there are two circumstances that 
constitute a sale and require the board to act as an auctioneer.127 These 
situations arise, “[(1)] when the corporation initiates the bidding process, 
seeking to sell itself or to effect a reorganization involving a change in 
control or a clear breakup of the company; and [(2)] when, in response to 
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an 
alternative.”128 The court drew attention to the fact that Time’s board was 
able to document a long-term strategy before implementing defense 
mechanisms.129 The opinion stated that the “legitimacy of a long-range 
plan is important when determining whether a board reasonably views 
and reacts to an acquiror [sic] as a threat.”130 The holding in Paramount 
could be read to imply that courts will afford boards a degree of 
deference when they are in disagreement with their shareholders, if the 
boards could show a legitimate long-term plan that they were 
implementing to protect the company. 
In summary, combining Revlon together with Paramount suggests 
that courts will require that boards pursue the best price for their 
shareholders in acquisitions, unless it appears that the board is 
implementing a long-term strategy to protect the company. This proposition 
relates to acqui-hires because target boards are not “auctioning” off their 
companies to get the best price, nor are they implementing long-term 
strategies to legitimately protect their companies and shareholders. The 
enhanced duties created in Revlon and Paramount are essential in change 
of control situations because the circumstances of such situations pose an 
extremely high risk to shareholders. 
 
 122. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1144–45, 1149. 
 123. See Moore, supra note 79, at 286. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1141–42. 
 126. Id. at 1142. 
 127. Moore, supra note 79, at 286. 
 128. Id. at 286–87. The court also noted that the possibility that a shareholder would tender in 
ignorance of another strategic benefit could be considered a perceived threat. Id. at 287. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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5. Justifications for Revlon Duties 
In situations involving corporate break ups, courts have agreed that 
the actions taken by boards are subject to enhanced scrutiny.131 This 
heightened scrutiny is necessary due to the possible reduction of current 
shareholders’ voting power and the fact that a control premium, which is 
an asset that belongs to stockholders, is being sold.132 Moreover, the 
courts have clarified that the duty “announced in Revlon, is not an 
independent duty, but rather a restatement of directors’ duties of loyalty 
and care.”133 It has been shown that “[d]irectors need not follow a 
particular path to maximize stockholder value, but the directors’ path 
must be a reasonable exercise toward accomplishing that end.”134 In the 
context of acqui-hiring, these justifications are applicable because the 
target investors are not being guaranteed a process to maximize value, 
and they lose voting power and control when the company is acquired 
and dissolved. 
To conclude, this Part presented the relevant information on acqui-
hires and analyzed the heightened scrutiny applied to board acquisition 
decisions when shareholder interest is in question. Acqui-hire transactions 
are only increasing in frequency and becoming more recognizable by the 
technology and legal communities. They are generally structured in a 
form more favorable to target employees than shareholders, and many 
times result in the premature death of an emerging company. In the past, 
Delaware courts have encountered situations where boards have made 
questionable decisions regarding their duties to shareholders in acquisition 
circumstances. At that time, the courts stepped up and demanded 
protection for shareholders in those types of situations. In extending the 
combined rationale of Revlon and Paramount to the acqui-hire context, 
it can be argued that acqui-hire target investors are losing power and 
control at a price that could easily be less than what they deserve. 
II.  An Examination of the Issues Posed by Acqui-Hires and an 
Offered Solution 
It is certain that “the use of acqui-hires to obtain talent 
continues;”135 however, investors, such as the founder of 500 Startups 
venture fund, Dave McClure, have given warning about the practice.136 
McClure explained that these types of talent acquisitions are “not what 
 
 131. Paramount Commc’ns v. Qvc Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(citing In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2012 WL 1253072, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2012)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Joseph W. Bartlett et al., Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Documents § 7.16 (2014). 
 136. Helft, supra note 1. 
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we are aiming for as investors . . . . We are trying to build large, lasting 
businesses.”137 Another well-known activist investor from Starboard 
Value has also critiqued the practice, insisting in a 2014 open letter to the 
CEO of Yahoo, that Yahoo “stop [its] pricey and ‘aggressive acquisition 
strategy’ dead in its tracks.”138 The frank letter stated that “[t]he $1.3 
billion spent on acquisitions has clearly not delivered value to 
shareholders,” and that “the acquired companies were, and still are, 
losing a considerable amount of money.”139 Nevertheless, warnings from 
investors such as these have still not “stopped some of tech’s biggest 
names for which buying season never seems to wane. Yahoo and 
Facebook snapped up at least 6 different small fish in 2014 alone, which 
[was] dwarfed by the 29 swallowed whole by Google.”140 Considering that 
the concerns investors have presented are going unacknowledged by 
large corporations, courts will likely have to make a determination 
regarding this practice soon. 
A. Lawsuits Involving Acqui-Hires Are Beginning to Emerge 
As acqui-hiring is somewhat of a novel practice, the court system 
has not seen many cases; however, those who have commented on acqui-
hiring have warned that lawsuits involving the practice could be on their 
way.141 One commentator has stated that there are causes of action 
available to shareholders, including fraud and breach of fiduciary 
duties.142 These particular causes of action are “centered around the 
notion that there’s a lot of money going to some shareholders 
(founders/employees) but not others (investors).”143 Expanding upon that 
concept in another article, that author warns that “some of these deals 
could theoretically be a violation of various corporate and securities laws 
that require shareholders of a given class to be treated equally in an 
acquisition.”144 In line with these legal predictions, California has already 
started to encounter complaints bearing the word “acqui-hire.”145 
 
 137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. Jackson Burke, Have Job, Will Buy Your Firm: Tech’s ‘Acqui-Hire’ Trend, CNBC (Nov. 9, 
2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102164860. 
 139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Michael Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-Hires, Uncrunched 
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://uncrunched.com/2012/04/24/some-investors-may-request-protection-from-aqui-
hires/ [hereinafter Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-Hires]; Michael 
Arrington, Facebook to Pay $10 Million Cash for Hot Potato, Says Source, TechCrunch (July 28, 
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/07/28/facebook-to-pay-10-million-cash-for-hot-potato-says-source/ 
[hereinafter Arrington, Facebook to Pay $10 Million Cash for Hot Potato]. 
 142. See Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-Hires, supra note 141. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Arrington, Facebook to Pay $10 Million Cash for Hot Potato, supra note 141. 
 145. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 3; Plaintiffs’ Opposition 
to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 1. 
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One example of an acqui-hire shareholder derivative suit is 
Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc., wherein the shareholder plaintiff brought 
suit against the board members of Graphicly, a target company in an 
acqui-hire.146 The shareholder alleged that the Graphicly board breached 
its fiduciary duties by terminating and transferring employees, along with 
failing to protect confidential company information.147 The complaint 
stated that Graphicly and Blurb entered into a nondisclosure agreement 
after Blurb expressed interest in an acqui-hire of Graphicly.148 
Thereafter, “Blurb, Inc. had full and complete access to all of Graphicly, 
Inc.’s proprietary and confidential information as well as unfettered 
access to top management who were allegedly essential to the value and 
continued success of Graphicly, Inc.”149 After the sale to Blurb was 
complete, the plaintiff claimed that the board terminated all Graphicly 
employees and, thereafter, members of Graphicly’s creative team were 
immediately hired by Blurb.150 This resulted in Blurb owning all 
proprietary and confidential information that the creative team 
possessed, which was gained from their employment at Graphicly.151 “At 
the same time, the six co-founders and creative team of Graphicly [who 
moved over to Blurb] were encouraging Graphicly’s customers and 
prospects to migrate to Blurb.”152 In the end, the shareholders received 
only $2.5 million, which was not a penny more than Blurb offered 
initially, before it examined Graphicly’s confidential information or 
negotiations began.153 
The complaint explained that a derivative suit was necessary 
because “Graphicly ha[d] no employees, no leadership, and ha[d] been 
stripped of its only real assets. It [was] not capable of taking any action 
on its own behalf.”154 The acqui-hire transaction transferred all of 
Graphicly’s key talent and intellectual property to Blurb. The plaintiff 
asserted that the employees who were allowed to move to Blurb received 
all of the benefit in the acqui-hire, while shareholders were left with only 
the amount of money that made up Blurb’s initial offer.155 While 
Graphicly is still in the pleadings stage, the case presents a viable 
 
 146. Jury Demanded, supra note 17; Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 
13, at 3. A shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the 
corporation itself. Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. 
Rev. 353, 353 (1999). 
 147. Jury Demanded, supra note 17, at 2. 
 148. Id.; Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 3. 
 149. Jury Demanded, supra note 17, at 2. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 2. 
 153. Id. at 3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
Nolan-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:26 PM 
870 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:849 
opportunity for the court to evaluate acqui-hire transactions and the 
impact they have on target companies and target shareholders.156 
Another example of an acqui-hire case is Opperman v. Path, Inc., 
which involved claims brought, not by shareholders, but by past tort 
victims of the target corporation.157 The plaintiffs claimed that the acqui-
hire transaction in their case was a fraudulent transfer and imposed 
successor liability on the purchaser, Facebook, for past misconduct by 
the target corporation, Gowalla.158 The Opperman plaintiffs pled for the 
court to take the opportunity to make a judicial determination regarding 
the practice of acqui-hires.159 
The complaint asserted that the acqui-hire caused Gowalla’s 
financial disarray and that by stripping Gowalla of its only real assets, the 
transaction rendered Gowalla insolvent.160 As a result of the Opperman 
acqui-hire, Gowalla’s two main assetsits principle employees, including 
its founder, and its technologywere transferred to Facebook.161 The 
plaintiffs claimed that Facebook and Gowalla knowingly failed to reserve 
adequate assets or finances to pay Gowalla creditors, such as the 
plaintiffs, and instead structured the deal to route the consideration, 
including stock in Facebook, to the employee managers of Gowalla.162 
Specifically, the complaint requested that the court find acqui-hires to be 
de facto acquisitions, which would require the purchasing corporations to 
take on the liabilities of the target companies, or to alternatively label 
acqui-hires as bona fide personnel licensing agreements.163 In accordance 
with that proposition, the plaintiffs alleged that the acqui-hire constituted 
a fraudulent transfer, imposing successor liability on Facebook.164 
Unfortunately for the Gowalla claimants, the Northern District of 
California dismissed the claims.165 The court stated there was no 
fraudulent transfer because the plaintiffs did not make a showing that 
they could not subject Gowalla’s intellectual property, which Gowalla 
theoretically retained, to the payment of debts in the future.166 Also, the 
 
 156. The parties mediated this dispute on March 11, 2015 before retired Judge David A. Garcia of 
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (“JAMS”). The parties reached a settlement and 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement on May 13, 2015. The 
motion was scheduled for hearing on July 23, 2015. Joint Case Management Conference Statement, 
Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc., No. C-14-04630-EJD, 2015 WL 6452139 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015).  
 157. Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 158. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 1–2. For definitions of “successor 
liability” and “fraudulent transfer,” see supra note 19. 
 159. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 4. 
 160. Id. at 10. 
 161. Id. at 7. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 4. 
 164. Id. at 2. 
 165. Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 166. Id. at 1066. 
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judge believed that the plaintiffs’ allegations based on successor liability 
were deficient because the plaintiffs did not allege that Facebook 
“acquired” Gowalla.167 In support of this assessment the judge explained 
that “the [Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint] expressly 
allege[d] the opposite: that Facebook acquired employees and intellectual 
property rights, but not Gowalla itself.”168 Indeed, the Opperman case is 
slightly convoluted, but it does reveal that plaintiffs need to be cautious 
when phrasing their allegations while courts familiarize themselves with 
the practice of acqui-hiring. 
In conclusion, commentators have identified that causes of action 
related to acqui-hires may be available, and Graphicly and Opperman 
are two such examples. Acqui-hires raise many legal concerns including 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, fraudulent transfer, and successor 
liability. This is a new practice that courts might be unfamiliar with, and 
guidance is needed in order to protect those that are adversely affected 
in these transactions. In untangling this corporate legal web, the best 
starting point is to address the duties of the target boards and identify 
what obligations the boards have. When attempting to distinguish what 
obligations should be imposed, it is best to begin first with analyzing 
exactly how shareholders are being harmed in these transactions. 
B. What Do Acqui-Hires Take from Shareholders? 
Concerns for shareholders at acqui-hire target corporations include 
a division between employees and shareholders based on the purchase 
price and a diminished life on their investment. As mentioned earlier in 
this Note, buyers in these transactions offer the deal consideration, 
including the consideration pot and the compensation pot, in a single 
aggregate amount.169 While outside investors and employees would 
prefer a greater amount to be allocated to the consideration pot, moving 
employees and the buyer want a greater amount to go toward the 
compensation pot.170 This creates a rift between employees and 
shareholders and, in fact, many of those who participate in acqui-hires 
admit to an amount of collusion between buyers and moving 
employees.171 Therefore, these transactions can be dangerous for target 
shareholders, who might receive extremely nominal or no consideration 
 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 297–99. Both the consideration pot, which eventually goes to 
outside investors and shareholders, and the compensation pot, which goes to the desired founders and 
employees for future work, are offered together. Id. at 297–98; see supra Part I.A.3. 
 170. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 299. The buyer wants more to go to the compensation pool 
because that pool provides incentives to move to the target employees, which is what the buyer cares 
about. See id. 
 171. Id. 
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in the deal.172 Moreover, acqui-hires cut the life of an investment short 
and diminish expected return if the consideration includes stock in a 
slower-growth public company.173 In addition to the significant concerns 
about the amount of payments shareholders receive at the closing of 
these transactions, there are also arguments that other rights of 
shareholders are being violated. 
An acqui-hire could constitute a conversion of a corporate 
opportunity, as the target company’s likely greatest opportunity at 
success rests with the engineering team to be acquired. The corporate 
opportunity doctrine explains that “[c]orporate officers and directors are 
not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further 
their private interests.”174 To illustrate, at the time of investing, 
shareholders are under the impression that they have first “dibs” to the 
engineering innovations that the team creates. This makes the 
engineering team itself a huge part of what the shareholders believe they 
were securing with their initial investment. However, after an acqui-hire, 
the “opportunity” for these investors to benefit from the team’s potential 
is transferred to the moving managing employees and the purchaser. 
Therefore, not only is the seizing of employees a main focus that 
shareholders need to consider, but also the resulting loss of any possible 
profits from current and future projects. 
It has been suggested that when an acqui-hire buyer not only 
poaches the team, but also takes the team’s projects, it eliminates the 
target company’s ability to sell those projects as an asset to another 
entity.175 It could be the case that “the acquiring corporation recognizes 
that value of the project but, nonetheless, prefers to bury the project to 
eliminate threats to its business model.”176 This is an issue for target 
investors because if the engineering team has proven itself well enough 
to get acqui-hired, then “surely, there often would be a party willing to 
pay some amount for these projects.”177 The inability of the target 
companies to sell projects raises yet another concern that shareholders of 
target corporations are not being given an opportunity to get the greatest 
 
 172. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 33. 
 173. Id. 
 174. DeLarme R. Landes, Economic Efficiency and the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: In 
Defense of a Contextual Disclosure Rule, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 837, 844 (2001) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). The doctrine is a “mechanism for allocating property rights between a 
corporation and those who manage it” so that managers of a corporation can not personally take 
business opportunities that they become aware of, due to their position, from the corporation without 
following specific disclosure protocols. Id. at 843 (quoting Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to 
Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277, 279 (1998)). 
 175. Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97 
Iowa L. Rev. 1085, 1097 (2012). 
 176. Id. at 1098 n.48. 
 177. Id. at 1098. 
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return on their investment, even if there does have to be a dissolution of 
the company. In addition to the issues of consideration division and loss 
of corporate opportunities and assets, there is also a concern that target 
corporations are protecting employees rather than shareholders, in 
conflict with their traditional fiduciary duties. 
C. Do Acqui-Hires Reflect a Fiduciary Duty to Employees or Are 
Employees Actually Harmed Too? 
Acqui-hires present a multifaceted situation for moving employees, 
encompassing a range of positive and negative aspects. For example, on 
one hand, the target employees stand to make a great amount of money 
in these deals. On the other hand, they may be required to stay at the 
buying company for an extended period of time to realize that money, 
and they will likely lose the ability to continue work on their current 
projects. Nevertheless, however employees perceive these deals, 
shareholder experience is supposed to be the focus at the target corporation. 
In acqui-hire transactions, it appears that the moving employees 
might be the ones at the target company who are getting the large 
payouts, while the investors are left with nominal amounts. Even though 
American corporate law requires fiduciary duties to shareholders, not to 
employees, many of the benefits that acqui-hire participants put forth 
seem to speak to the advantages that the target employees experience, 
with little discussion of effects on the target shareholders. To illustrate, 
Vaughan Smith, Facebook’s Director of Corporate Development and a 
participant in the twenty or so talent acquisitions that the company has 
participated in over the past four years, has made the assessment that 
“[e]ngineers are worth half a million to one million.”178 The employees 
who are acquired in these transactions get a highly rich salary and often 
even more stock options.179 Dave McClure, an investor previously 
mentioned, has said that these sales for “a few million will not make or 
break [the] funds” of target investors, but “it could amount to a tidy sum 
for an engineer just out of college.”180 Paul Graham, another well-known 
investor and a partner at Y Combinator, a firm that has invested in 
hundreds of start-ups, has asked, “[w]ho are we to tell a young 
entrepreneur that they can’t have their first million?”181 These remarks 
suggest that commentators have taken notice that, if anyone is getting 
rich in these transactions, it is not investors, but the moving employees. 
While it is true that moving employees may stand to make the 
greatest initial profit, the acqui-hire process still presents issues that 
 
 178. Helft, supra note 1. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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many target engineers will face when they are acquired. In fact, even 
though “[n]either the acquired nor the acquirers like to talk numbers. . . . 
the acquisitions are generally in stock, and employees typically must wait 
a year or more before they can sell their shares.”182 In regard to this, one 
of the largest acqui-hire purchasers, Facebook, contends that structuring 
the transactions this way is beneficial as a buyer because they “need[] 
creative entrepreneurs who can also help keep Facebook’s start-up 
culture alive.”183 Moreover, when a buyer takes ownership of the past 
projects, even if it has no interest in furthering them, the buyer reduces 
the risk that the acquired team would continue developing the projects 
on the side, because any success in such projects would go to the buyer.184 
Therefore, taking ownership of the projects is a way to reduce the risk of 
employee disloyalty, as well as stifle possible competition by successful 
engineers.185 In addition, along the lines of employee concerns, but unrelated 
to the concerns of moving employees, an even more disheartening fact is 
that employees that are not desired and do not join the buying company 
are generally laid off following the transaction.186 In conclusion, the sum 
value of these concerns is that acqui-hired engineers can be encouraged 
to work at slower growth public companies for a minimum amount of 
time based on stock structure. Furthermore, the opportunity of innovation 
for them personally and society as a whole is robbed in an effort to reduce 
competition in the field. Whilst acqui-hires present troublesome 
circumstances for investors and employees alike, an answer to these 
concerns can be found in Revlon duties. 
D. Structures of Acqui-Hires Comply with the Requirements to 
Trigger REVLON 
The structure of acqui-hire transactions falls squarely within the 
required elements laid out in Revlon: 
[C]ircumstances requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny give rise to what 
are known as Revlon duties, such as [(1)] when the board enters into a 
merger transaction that will cause a change in corporate control, [(2)] 
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell the corporation, or 
[(3)] makes a break up of the corporate entity inevitable.187 
 
 182. Id. (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 176, at 1097. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Darshan Shankar, What Is a Typical Deal Structure of an Acquihire?, Quora (Dec. 10, 2012), 
https://www.quora.com/What-is-a-typical-deal-structure-of-an-acquihire. 
 187. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003) (citing Paramount 
Commc’ns v. Qvc Network, 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994), and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)). 
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Acqui-hires can arguably satisfy the second circumstance, “initiating 
an active bidding process seeking to sell,”188 because these deals are 
generally framed as asset sales, and therefore, the target boards do find 
themselves in an active sale process. Comparatively, even if stock is 
included in the deal consideration, the result is the buying company 
having a controlling share in the target, at least until they formally 
dissolve it, therefore qualifying as a “merger transaction that will cause a 
change in corporate control.”189 In addition, as acqui-hires become 
increasingly common in the small Silicon Valley, it can be argued that 
when target board members seriously consider an acqui-hire offer, they 
should be aware that dissolution of the company is “inevitable,” 
satisfying the third circumstance. Each of these occurrences, especially 
considered collectively, show that acqui-hire transactions meet the 
circumstances requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny and the application of 
Revlon. 
The argument could be made that these “break ups” are not 
inevitable because acqui-hire buyers could keep the company alive in a 
theoretical sense, but the requirements for Revlon duties, nevertheless, 
would still be present. For example, the buyer could argue that 
dissolution of the target is not “inevitable” simply because the buyer 
could still theoretically pursue the target company’s past projects. 
However, in order for Revlon duties to take effect, Revlon does not 
require that a dissolution or break up necessarily be “inevitable,” per 
se.190 The court in Revlon did state that one of the circumstances that 
requires heightened scrutiny is an inevitable dissolution.191 It does not, 
however, follow that such is a necessity before directors are subject to 
enhanced scrutiny and are required to retrieve the best value available to 
stockholders.192 In fact, Revlon stated, “‘when bidders make relatively 
similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable,’ the 
directors need to fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties.”193 Furthermore, in 
interpreting Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has reiterated that this 
enhanced scrutiny and need to obtain the best value for shareholders is 
present when “there is a pending sale of control, regardless of whether 
[. . .] there is to be a break-up of the corporation.”194 Two events that 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 46. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 194. Id. at 46; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) 
(stating that directors have a responsibility to attain the highest value reasonably attainable for 
shareholders when there is a sale of corporate control); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 
1286 (Del. 1989) (asserting that Revlon governs every case in which even a fundamental change of 
corporate control occurs or is contemplated). 
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have the greatest impact on stockholders are both the sale of control or a 
corporate break up, and therefore, each of these events alone creates the 
requirement that directors be charged with attaining the best value for 
shareholders, and each is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.195 Both a 
sale of control and a break up implicate a corporation in a significant, 
fundamental, and likely irreversible way; accordingly, Revlon duties are 
ignited in both instances.196 Therefore, even if an acqui-hire buyer could 
argue that dissolution of the target corporation is not “inevitable,” the 
sale of control itself could ignite heightened scrutiny of the target board’s 
decisions. 
Moreover, even if the acqui-hire process is not viewed as a 
dissolution that satisfies the requirements for igniting Revlon, and 
instead is seen as controlling investors or managers exercising their right 
to sell, the practice still calls for a higher level of review. Acqui-hires by 
nature involve a great amount of self-dealing, as many of those who may 
be engaged in the negotiation process on the seller’s side will likely be 
future employees of the buying side. In fact, one attorney author has 
warned that insulation of board members in acqui-hires is important 
because “assuming [the target company’s stock] is held by a small cohort, 
most if not all of the directors will be ‘interested’ in the transaction.”197 
Furthermore, the business judgment rule should not offer protection in 
these circumstances because that rule itself calls for its use only when 
there is no conflict of interest present.198 Based on the business judgment 
rule’s own requirements, along with the general need to provide 
protection for shareholders, courts should analyze these transactions 
under a reasonableness or an entire fairness standard. Moreover, even if 
the target’s biggest controlling institutional investors approve of the deal, 
the general rule that controlling investors can sell their control at a 
premium price has exceptions, including bad faith and conversion of a 
corporate opportunity.199 For the reasons stated above, it can easily be a 
concern that these deals will be completed in bad faith on the part of the 
target company and/or its controlling investors. Looking further, not only 
do the structures of these transactions comply with requirements for 
higher judicial review, but the surrounding corporate climate calls for 
heightened scrutiny as well. 
 
 195. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 47–48. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Danielle Naftulin, So You’re Being Acqui-Hired . . . , Cooley GO, https://www.cooleygo.com/ 
acqui-hire-basics/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 198. FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 199. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685 (1979). 
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E. The Surrounding Concerns That First Brought About REVLON 
Duties Are Present in the Acqui-Hire Structure 
The environment surrounding acqui-hire transactions is reminiscent 
of the climate that brought about Revlon duties in the first instance. As 
mentioned in Part I.B, the decisions in Revlon and surrounding cases 
were influenced by the corporate climate of the 1980s.200 The corporate 
focus of that time, similar to the focus in acqui-hires, was on short-run 
returns instead of long-term gains.201 The acquirers then, similar to the 
acqui-hire purchasers now, were not concerned with the target 
corporations themselves or their shareholders.202 Thirty years ago, the 
courts stepped in when directors and institutional investors began 
restructuring corporate transactions at the detriment to shareholders; 
now an intervention by the courts is needed again. Even if some might 
contend that Revlon does not apply to these deals, corporate judges are 
well known for their desire to implement good policy and they will likely 
be willing to stretch the Revlon policy where needed. 
F. REVLON Duties Can Apply to Boards of Private Companies and 
the Duties Exist When There Is a Single Bidder 
Those who disagree that acqui-hires ignite Revlon duties could 
argue that the common target corporations are not thought to be the 
type traditionally encompassed by Revlon. This could be either because 
the targets are generally private companies or because there is usually 
only a single bidder. These arguments, however, have been deflated by 
legal literature and recent Delaware cases. 
The Revlon court’s language raised doubt as to whether Revlon 
duties were a responsibility of directors for private companies,203 which 
most of the targets in acqui-hires are. Yet, valid arguments have been 
raised for applying these duties to nonpublic companies. When the 
Revlon court made its decision, the opinion appeared to limit Revlon 
duties to only public corporate break ups by avoiding all change of 
control and prefatory language.204 Nevertheless, if the holding “could be 
expanded under the prefatory language, then the sale of control of a 
private company could trigger Revlon.”205 This relates to acqui-hire deals 
because most of the targets are likely private corporations and the 
transactions result in a change of control in the buyer’s favor. Moreover, 
authors of another piece that briefly explores Revlon duties in the 
 
 200. Moore, supra note 79, at 277–79. 
 201. Id. at 278–79. 
 202. Id. at 279. 
 203. Kerr, supra note 9, at 644 n.255. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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context of acqui-hires, argue that boards of private companies, regardless 
of size, could possibly still be bound by the fiduciary duties created in 
Revlon.206 The authors caution that California corporations should be 
mindful of Delaware corporate law because California applies the same 
basic duties of care and loyalty.207 In the discussion of Revlon’s 
application to private companies, they cite the In re Openlane, Inc. 
decision, in which the court explained that “‘[t]he fact that a company is 
small . . . does not modify core fiduciary duties. . . . In other words, small 
companies do not get a pass just for being small.’”208 The article 
acknowledges that there is a potential for deference to a board when it is 
made up of founders and experienced professional investors, and also 
that there is a reduced risk of shareholder litigation in closely held 
companies.209 Nevertheless, it warns that boards that are considering 
acqui-hire transactions still have an obligation to fulfill their duties of 
care during these deliberations.210 The piece cautions that these private 
target boards “should carefully review potential alternative buyers, 
market and competitive factors, and company projections and financing 
prospects.”211 While the authors of that article caution that the 
application of Revlon to acqui-hires could eventually be a possibility, this 
Note proposes that, in consideration of each of the unsettling factors 
presented, courts should begin applying the Revlon standard now. 
Acqui-hire transactions are generally structured with an initial 
single-bidder, but even in single bidder situations (as compared to cases 
such as Revlon, where competing bidders were present) boards are still 
required to satisfy their Revlon duties. The Delaware Court of Chancery, 
just two years ago, heard two cases that questioned whether two different 
boards satisfied their Revlon duties within sale-of-control transactions 
involving a single bidder.212 In both cases, the court found that the 
board’s initial decision to pursue a single-bidder process was 
reasonable.213 However, in only one of the cases, In re Plains Exploration 
& Production Co. Stockholder Litigation, did the court conclude that the 
 
 206. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 33–34 (citing Cirrus Holding Co. Ltd. v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 
794 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 2001)). 
 207. Id. at 34. 
 208. Id. (quoting In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 209. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 34. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Recent Delaware Court of Chancery Decisions 
Address Revlon Duties in Single-Bidder Sale-of-Control Transactions 1 (June 17, 2013). 
 213. Id. (citing In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 
1909124 (Del. Ch. 2013), and Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 
(Del. Ch. 2013)). 
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board members satisfied their fiduciary duties under Revlon.214 In the 
second case, Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., the court found that the 
directors would likely fail to meet this burden.215 In Koehler, the court 
found that the board had likely failed at carrying out its duties of 
remaining fully informed and acting reasonably throughout the process, 
as required by Revlon.216 The court in Koehler noted that, “[w]hile a 
single-bidder sale process is not per se unreasonable, if a board elects to 
pursue a single-bidder process and forgo a presigning market check,” 
that may be taken into account by a court.217 The lack of a pre-signing 
market check along with the board’s other actions, “taken as a whole, 
must result in a process that is reasonably designed to maximize the price 
to be received by the stockholders.”218 Moreover, in the single-bidder 
process, the target company’s ability, or lack thereof, to “conduct a ‘de 
facto,’ postsigning [sic] market check may be significant,” which is 
something that a “target’s board should be aware of in negotiating both 
the deal protection measures and length of the preclosing [sic] period for 
the acquisition agreement.”219 Considering the recent emphasis on the 
likelihood of corporate judges to comply with Revlon policy in both 
private and single bidder situations, it seems that acqui-hire transactions 
have little legal argument to hide behind. 
To summarize, this Part pointed to areas that call for concern in 
acqui-hire transactions and provided a solution within Revlon duties. 
California courts are beginning to see acqui-hire cases and will likely 
need to establish a standard under which to scrutinize those claims. 
Moreover, acqui-hire transactions take a great amount away from 
shareholders including reduced return on investment, possible conversion 
of a corporate opportunity, and the inability to sell past projects at a 
premium. Also, the way that employees are treated in acqui-hires raises 
concerns, ranging from misplaced fiduciary duties that should belong to 
the investors, to more negative experiences like an employee’s inability 
to continue projects. Lastly, this Part verified that Revlon duties can 
apply to acqui-hires due to their structure, and that concerns such as self-
dealing increase the need to encourage heightened judicial scrutiny in 
these transactions. 
 
 214. Id.; In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
 215. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, supra note 212, at 1; Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, 
Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 216. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, supra note 212, at 1 (citing Koehler, 2013 WL 2181518). 
 217. Id. at 6. 
 218. Id. at 1. 
 219. Id. at 6. 
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Conclusion 
When a purchaser approaches a target corporation with an acqui-
hire and the managing board members are seriously considering the 
offer, that board’s actions should be strictly scrutinized following the 
Revlon standards. At that point, the target company’s directors become 
auctioneers for the stockholders. Consequently, they should actively seek 
out other companies who might want to be the buyer in the acqui-hire or 
even purchase the target in a more traditional manner. The boards owe 
fiduciary duties to stockholders, preferred and common, not to 
employees, and the Revlon duties explicitly require protection for the 
shareholders. To go even further, the standard of review called for under 
Revlon is a reasonableness standard; however, considering the fact that 
acqui-hires by nature involve a great amount of self-dealing, as many of 
those who are engaged in the negotiation process on the seller’s side will 
likely be future employees of the buying side, an even higher standard 
could be considered if needed. Additionally, bolstering this argument, 
the business judgment rule itself also calls for its use only when there is 
no conflict of interest present. To protect investors, courts should analyze 
these transactions under a reasonableness standard incorporating Revlon 
considerations and, even further, an entire fairness standard if self-
dealing can be identified. 
Though arguments may be made that the target boards do not fall 
under Revlon, either because the target companies are private or because 
the deals consist of a single bidder, there are still ways to enhance the 
judicial scrutiny of these transactions. The general rule governing the 
sale of controlling shares specifically says that controlling shareholders 
can sell their control at a premium price, but even this standard has 
exceptions including bad faith and conversion of a corporate opportunity. 
For the reasons stated above, it can easily be a concern that these deals 
will be completed in bad faith on the part of the target board. Target 
board members in acqui-hires should be scrutinized under a higher 
standard than is generally granted to board members. Acqui-hire 
transactions encompass the exact concerns that inspired courts to create 
the protection of Revlon duties in the first place, and acqui-hires provide 
the perfect opportunity for Revlon’s modern application. 
